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Summary
The role of civilians in UN peacekeeping and peace­
building missions has shifted from a peripheral sup­
port role to the core of contemporary peacekeep­
ing and peacebuilding missions, and the number of 
civil ians have steadily increased over the years to ap­
proximately 22,000 in 2010. Civilians now constitute 
20% of UN peacekeepers, and approximately 60% 
of the top twenty civilian contributing countries are 
from the Global South. 
Whilst the UN finds it difficult to identify candi­
dat es in certain specialised categories, in 
gen e ral it has an oversupply of candidates. 
The main challenge facing the UN when it comes to 
recruitment, is processing the large number of ap­
plications it receives, selecting the most deserving 
candidates, and the time it takes to process an ap­
plication from the moment a vacancy is announced 
until a person is deployed to take up the post. The 
linkages between training institutions, rosters and 
the UN recruitment system are underdeveloped. 
The aim of investing in training and rostering, name­
ly shortening the time it will take to fill an urgently 
needed post with a suitably prepared candidate, is 
not being realised under the current relationship 
between the UN, training institutions and rosters. 
The UN Secretary­General’s 2009 report on peace­
building provides a solid basis for engagement be­
tween the UN and the international peace opera­
tions community. The establishment of a global 
civilian capacity partnership that brings together 
the international training and rostering community, 
the UN system, and interested UN Member States, 
would contribute significantly to addressing these 
challenges.  
Introduction
One of the most significant, but often overlooked, de-
velopments in United Nations (UN) is the transforma-
tion from military to civilian focussed peace missions. 
This change has come about as the mandates shifted 
from monitoring military ceasefires to supporting the 
implementation of comprehensive peace agreements. 
As these missions became more peacebuilding orien-
tated, the role of civilians became more central, the 
number of civilian functions increased, and the role of 
civilians shifted from a peripheral support role to the 
core of contemporary peacekeeping and peacebuild-
ing missions. Civilians now represent approximately 
20% of all UN peacekeepers and peacebuilders. As at 
28 February 2010, the UN had almost 22,000 civilians 
deployed, including approximately 8,200 internation-
al staff, of which 2,400 were UN volunteers.2  
The UN now deploys more civilian peacekeepers 
than all the other multilateral institutions combined. 
At the beginning of 2010, the European Union (EU) 
had deployed approximately 2,000 civilian personnel; 
the Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) approximately 3,000, and the African Union 
(AU) deployed approximately 50 civilians in its current 
operation in Somalia. 
There is a misperception that the Global South is 
under-represented in civilian posts within UN peace-
1 The author wishes to recognize the editorial support of Walter 
Lotze and Andreas Øien Stensland from NUPI, as well as very 
useful comments and suggestions from the UN Civilian Capa-
city Review team in the UN Peacebuilding Support Office
2 All peacekeeping related statistics in this paper, unless otherwise 
indicated, is based on the DPKO Fact Sheet, http://www.un.org/
Depts/dpko/dpko/factsheet.pdf, accessed on 16 June 2010, or on 
correspondence with DPKO and PBSO in June 2010.
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keeping and peacebuilding missions. Yet among the 
top 20 nations from which civilian expertise is re-
cruited, which contribute 49,8% of civilian expertise 
to UN missions, 31,1% are from the South.3 For exam-
ple, 40% of civil affairs officers in UN missions are 
drawn from Africa, 14% from the Americas (excluding 
the USA), 10% from Asia and 3% from Oceania. Thus, 
a total of 67% of civil affairs officers in UN missions 
come from the Global South. Approximately 20% of 
all civil affairs officers are UN volunteers.
In comparison to UN peace operations, the number 
of civilians in African peace operations have, to date, 
been rather limited. There were approximately 50 civil-
ian staff in the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS), com-
pared to the 1,134 international civilian staff, 419 UN Vol-
unteers and 2,557 national civilian staff in the current 
African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in 
Darfur (UNAMID).  The ongoing African Union Mis-
sion in Somalia (AMISOM) has approximately 33 inter-
national staff and 15 national staff as of November 2009. 
There is, however, a relatively high percentage of 
Africans in UN peace operations. There were 9 Afri can 
countries among the top 20 contributors of internatio-
nal civilian staff to UN missions in 2009, namely: 2nd 
Kenya (4.8%), 7th Ghana (2.9%), 8th Sierra Leone 
(2.7%), 10th Ethiopia (2.3%), 11th Nigeria (2.2%), 14th 
Uganda (1.7%), 15th Cameroon (1.6%), 17th Tanzania 
(1.5%) and 18th Cote d’Ivoire (1.3%). In addition to the 
international staff, in 2009 the UN has employed 
15,442 national professional and general service staff 
in UN missions, and of these 10,109, or approximately 
75%, were Africans.4
Recruitment and Deployment Challenges
The UN finds it difficult to identify candidates in cer-
tain specialised categories, including in security sec-
tor reform, judicial and prisons management. This is 
partly a function of the availability of these skills in 
the marketplace in general. To address this problem 
DPKO has proposed the enhance ment of the existing 
Standing Police Capa city to include justice and correc-
tions specialists. 
However, in general, UN experience shows that the as-
sumption in the civilian capacity debate, namely that 
there is a world-wide shortage of civilian expertise, is 
flawed. The UN receives more than 150,000 applica-
tions per year for its civilian peacekeeping field posi-
tions.5 This means that the UN receives approximately 
1,500 applications for every civilian position adver-
tised, of which approximately 50 are qualified to be 
considered for the position.6  
Despite the high number of people eager to serve in 
UN missions, the UN suffers from high vacancy rates 
in its missions. The average vacancy rate of interna-
tional civilian staff for UN operations between 2005 
and 2008 has been around 22%.7 In some missions 
the figures are much higher, especially during the 
start-up phase. The UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNA-
MID) had a vacancy rate of 56% in 2008, the UN Mis-
sion in Sudan (UNMIS) had a vacancy rate of 40% 
in 2005, and the UN Mission in Afghanistan had a 
vacancy rate of 42%  at the beginning of 2010.8 
The approximate 200 days that it takes the UN recruit-
ment system to fill a vacancy, indicates that the system 
is slow and bureaucratic, and not meeting the deploy-
ment needs of the peacekeeping and peacebuilding 
missions context.9 Despite the large number of appli-
cants, there are also persistent complaints from with-
in the system about the quality and appropriateness of 
the candidates that are short-listed for selection. 
The main challenge facing the UN is processing the 
large number of applications it receives, selecting the 
most deserving candidates, and the time it takes to pro-
cess an application from the moment a vacancy is an-
nounced until a person is deployed to take up the post.
A number of recent reports and studies have addressed 
these problems and have highlighted the need to fur-
ther strengthen the civilian contribution to peacekeep-
ing and peacebuilding missions.10 However, the UN’s 
recruitment approach seems to have overcome many 
of the dilemmas experienced by the EU and others. 
Because the UN does not rely on secondments, it does 
not have a problem attracting staff from the smaller 
and less developed countries. As mentioned earlier, 
3 2010 Annual Review of Peace Operations (New York: Center for 
International Cooperation).
4 2010 Annual Review of Peace Operations (New York: Center for 
International Cooperation).
5 Catriona Gourlay, Rosters for the Deployment of Civilian Experts 
in Peace Operations, a DPKO Lessons Learned Study (New York: 
United Nations, 2006, p. 6).
6 Durch, W.J., Strengthening UN Secretariat Capacity for Civilian 
Post-Conflict Response, article prepared for the Center on In-
ternational Cooperation and the Government of Denmark’s 
Meeting on Strengthening the UN’s Capacity on Civilian Crisis 
Management, Copenhagen, 8-9 June 2004, p.9.
7  Solli, A., de Carvalho, B., de Coning, C.H. & Pedersen, M.F. 
2009, Bottlenecks to Deployment: The Challenges of Deploying Ci-
vilian Personnel to Peace Operations, Security in Practice 3/2009 
(Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, p.10).
8 UNAMA Fact Box, Kabul: United Nations, 2010. 
9 See Low-Level Panel, Practical Steps to a More Effective and Efficient 
United Nations, New York: www.lowlevelpanel.org, 2004, p.5.
10 In addition to those already referred too, see also: Chandran, 
R., Sherman, J., Jones, B., Forman, S., Le More, A. & Hart, A., 
Rapid Deployment of Civilians for Peace Operations: Status, Gaps 
and Options (New York: Center on International Cooperation, 
2009, Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Im-
mediate Aftermath of Conflict, A/63/881-S/2009/304, New York: 
 United Nations , 11 June 2009, and United Nations, A New Part-
nership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping, 
New York: Department of Peacekeeping Operations and De-
partment of Field Support, July 2009.
360% of the top twenty civilian contributing countries 
are from the Global South. The same phenomenon 
seems to apply to gender. The UN has a higher pro-
portion of women in peace operations than most of its 
Member States have in their civil service. Currently, 
approximately 30% of the civilians in UN peace op-
erations are women, but there are still disappointingly 
few women in senior positions.
Training and Rostering Challenges
The training of civilians should occur before recruit-
ment, in preparation for deployment, on joining a 
mission (induction training), and following deploy-
ment (in-mission). Some training institutions, like 
the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution 
of Disputes (ACCORD), are increasingly focussing 
on in-mission training, that is aimed at sharpening 
skills needed in particular contexts or to address new 
needs not previously addressed.11 All new civilian UN 
staff now also undergo generic induction training at 
the UN training centre in Brindisi before deployment. 
Most missions offer an induction course for all new 
staff upon entering a new mission. This will typically 
be conducted by the mission’s training cell, but there 
have been cases where these courses have also been 
conducted by civilian training centres, as has been 
done by ACCORD for AMISOM and by Scuola Supe-
riore Sant’Anna for OSCE missions.
The civilian training centres coordinate their work 
with each other through international and regional as-
sociations and there is a good degree of cooperation 
and coordination underway among the civilian train-
ing community.12 However, the same cannot be said 
for the relationship between training and UN recruit-
ment. The linkages between training institutions, ros-
ters and the UN recruitment system are underdevel-
oped and under-explored.
Standby rosters are often seen as an obvious solution 
to the civilian capacity gap. The idea is that individuals 
are pre-trained, pre-identified and placed on a stand-
by roster, and that they are then ready to be deployed 
when the need arises. The reality has, however, proven 
more complex.There are several different types of ros-
ters. A standing capacity has staff that are employed 
on a full time basis, with the express purpose of be-
ing available as a surge capacity when the need arises. 
A standby capacity consists of persons pre-identified 
to be deployed when the need arises, usually within 
a specified time-frame. Finally, a rostered capacity op-
erates as a database of potential candidates that can 
be approached and whose suitability assessed as the 
need arises.13  There are several such rosters in exist-
ence, and most are either national rosters or civil so-
ciety based.14  
In the UN civilian capacity context there is a tension 
between calls for the development of more civilian ros-
ters on the one hand, whilst on the other, the General 
Assembly resolutions that have restricted the use of 
gratis personnel in UN missions seem to have resulted 
in a general policy in the UN Secretariat not to work 
with rosters.15  The concerns behind these policies are 
understandable and need to be addressed, but cooper-
ating with rosters need not have a negative impact on 
the UN’s recruitment policies. Most UN agencies do 
cooperate with rosters without negative consequen ces. 
Rosters provide a complementary pool of potential can-
didates that the UN can consider, especially for those 
categories of personnel that it finds difficult to hire on 
the open market, but the choice and management of 
personnel remain with the UN. The purpose of invest-
ing in a roster – shortening the time it will take to fill 
an urgently needed post – is not realised under the cur-
rent relationship between the UN and rosters.
  
Conclusion and Recommendations
The main challenge facing the UN is processing the 
large number of applications it receives, selecting the 
most deserving candidates, and the time it takes to pro-
cess an application from the moment a vacancy is an-
nounced until a person is deployed to take up the post. 
The UN Secretary-General’s 2009 report on peace-
building provides a solid basis for engagement between 
the UN and the international peace operations training 
and rostering community. The establishment of a glo-
bal civilian capacity partnership that brings together 
the international training and rostering community, 
the relevant branches of the UN Secretariat and UN 
agencies, and interested UN Member States, would 
contribute significantly to addressing these challenges. 
13 For example, CANADEM, a national NGO roster of Canadians, 
has around 15,000 persons in its database, and RedR, an inter-
national NGO roster specializing in engineering in emergen-
cies, has approximately 20,000 candidates. See Catriona Gour-
lay, ,2006,p.14.
14 Australia’s new Deployable Civilian Capacity, the United King-
dom’s Stabilization Unit roster, and the German Peace Opera-
tion Centre (ZIF) would be examples of national rosters, whilst 
the Norwegian Refugee Council’s NORCAPS, CANADEM, and 
the African Civilian Standby Roster for International Humani-
tarian and Peacekeeping Missions (AFDEM), are examples of 
civil-society rosters. 
 15 General Assembly Resolutions 51/243 of 15 September 1997 and 
52/234 of 26 June 1998.
11 ACCORD (www.accord.org.za) has conducted Conflict Man-
agement for Peacekeepers and Peacebuilders Courses in AMI-
SOM, MINURCAT, MONUC, ONUCI, UNAMID, UNMIL and 
UNMIS since 2008, and Civil-Military Coordination Courses 
in AMIS, AMISOM, MONUC and UNMIS since 2006.
12 Coordination occurs through the International Association of 
Peacekeeping Training Centers (www.iaptc.org) and, for in-
stance in Africa, through the African Peace Support Trainer’s 
Association (www.apsta.org).
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An initial step could be to significantly improve the 
link between recruitment, rostering and training 
among the civilian peacekeeping and peacebuilding 
community. One of the objectives of such a partner-
ship could be to support the UN in its efforts to reform 
the recruitment system, as it is clear that such a pro-
cess would require political support among Member 
States, additional resources, a concerted effort on the 
side of the Secretariat, and support from civil society.
 
Steps that can be taken by the United Nations
•	 The	primary	focus	of	 the	UN	Secretariat	should	be	
on improving the UN recruitment system, with the 
aim of reducing the time it takes to hire new staff 
and to improve internal standing capacities and ros-
ters. It also needs to improve the quality of the per-
sonnel delivered to the field. The focus should thus 
be on addressing these shortcomings, rather than on 
developing new rosters and rapid deployable systems 
that will require considerable time and resources, 
and that have a poor track record of success.
 
•	 The	UN	Secretariat	needs	to	be	encouraged	to	en-
ter into meaningful relationships with the training 
and rostering institutions because they represent 
existing capacities that can be made available to UN 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations.
Steps that can be taken by Member States
•	 The	 current	 UN	 initiatives	 (Civilian	 Capacity	 Re-
view and Recruitment System Reform) could ben-
efit from increased and sustained Member State at-
tention and support. Civilian capacity needs to be 
transformed from an internal technical issue to a 
strategic partnership issue. Clear benchmarks need 
to be identified, and the UN Secretariat needs to 
be given the resources necessary to achieve those 
benchmarks. Interested Member States could cre-
ate a ‘Friends-of-Civilian Capacity’ entity that can 
ensure that there are sustained and focussed atten-
tion on this issue and that the Secretariat is sup-
ported in a systematic and coordinated manner.
•	 The	 concerns	 of	 the	 Global	 South	 need	 to	 be	 ad-
dressed. Initiatives in the North could be paired with 
initiatives in the South with the aim of ensuring a 
fair and equitable supply. UN peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding missions could benefit from more ci-
vilian personnel from the South that have cultural, 
linguistic and applied skill sets that are appropriate-
ly matched with the societies hosting such missions.
Steps that can be taken by the Training and Rostering 
Community
•	 There	are	several	existing	institutions	that	specialise	
in civilian peacekeeping training and that are orga-
nised within the context of the International Asso-
ciation of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC). 
And there are several international rosters that are 
currently successfully providing civilian personnel 
to UN agencies and NGOs. These organisations are 
willing to support the UN to strengthen the link-
ages between training, rostering and recruitment. 
The training and rostering community could estab-
lish closer working relations with each other, and 
with the UN Secretariat, with a view to exploring 
how they could cooperate to strengthen the UN’s 
civilian capacity.
 
•	 Whilst	there	is	a	good	global	spread	of	training	in-
stitutions, most civilian training centres and most 
rosters seem to be clustered in the North. More can 
be done to encourage the development of civilian 
training and rostering in the Global South.
